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 1 
This paper argues that the Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) 
Regulations 20141  are fatally flawed. This criticism is often levelled at knee-jerk 
responses to policy crises created without the benefit of time and thought. Yet, these 
Regulations were the product of a sensitively executed public inquiry. I argue that the 
2014 Regulations will fail because they rely too heavily on the rhetoric of criminal law 
while failing to take into account the competing norms for compliance and the impact 
of NHS budget constraints. They push the CQC towards a deterrence approach to 
enforcement, increasing hostility between regulatees and inspectors, and ultimately 
reducing the scope for developing the transparency about failures which is sorely 
needed in the NHS. This paper challenges the contemporary wisdom that it is 
primarily knee-jerk regulatory responses that suffer from fatal flaws of this nature. 
 
(A) The 2014 Regulations 
The 2014 Regulations enact the ‘fundamental standards of minimum safety and 
quality’2 recommended by the Francis inquiry into the Stafford Hospital fiasco in the 
2010s. This framework of standards is to be met by health and social care providers 
in England and Wales. Their aim is to protect the dignity of service users while 
ensuring a high level of safety across health and social care services. The 2014 
Regulations encompass twelve minimum standards covering fourteen ‘regulated 
activities’. These activities make up the business of healthcare provision, including 
personal care; accommodation for persons requiring nursing or personal care; 
accommodation for persons requiring treatment for substance abuse; treatment of 
disease, disorder or injury; assessment or medical treatment for persons detained 
                                               
1
 2014/2936. Hereinafter, “the 2014 Regulations”. 
2
 Robert Francis QC, Report of the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry 
Executive Summary 2013 at 
<http://www.midstaffspublicinquiry.com/sites/default/files/report/Executive%20summary.pdf>, 
table of recommendations 
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under the Mental Health Act 1983; surgical procedures; diagnostic or screening 
procedures; management or supply of blood and blood derived products; transport 
services, triage and medical advice provided remotely; maternity and midwifery 
services; termination of pregnancies; nursing care; and family planning services.3 
They apply across all regulated activities, and providers must meet standards in 
relation to those activities that they engage in.  
 
Many of the new standards are similar to those in place previously. The 2014 
Regulations replace the Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) 
Regulations 20104, all of which can be mapped directly onto the 2014 Regulations. 
Some of the 2010 Regulations map onto a single regulation in the 2014 Regulations, 
such as the care and welfare of service users5 which has become person-centred 
care6, or respecting and involving service users7  which has become dignity and 
respect.8 Some regulations have been merged to form a single new regulation in the 
2014 Regulations, such as the new regulation on premises and equipment9 which is 
made up from the 2010 Regulations on cleanliness and infection control,10 safety and 
suitability of premises11 and safety and suitability of equipment.12 One of the 2010 
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4
 2010/781. Hereinafter, “the 2010 Regulations”. 
5
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6
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Regulations, cleanliness and infection control13 has been split and now forms part of 
the new regulations on premises and equipment14, and safe care and treatment15. 
See figure 1 for a map of how the 2010 Regulations map onto the 2014 Regulations. 
 
There are two important changes in the 2014 Regulations. First is the new duty of 
candour introduced in regulation 20. This requires health service bodies to ‘act in an 
open and transparent way’ about errors.16 This entails providing a full account and 
apology to the relevant individuals whenever a notifiable incident has occurred.17 The 
second important difference in the 2014 Regulations is the change in tone. The 
language has more imperative force than the 2010 Regulations. For example, 
regulation 11 (2010) provides that the service provider ‘must make suitable 
arrangements to ensure that service users are safeguarded against the risk of 
abuse’. Regulation 13 (2014) provides that ‘service users must be protected from 
abuse and improper treatment’. Similar changes in tone are evident across all the 
new regulations. There is a move away from healthcare providers “ensuring” that 
certain things are provided, towards requiring that needs “must” be met. This is not 
just a rhetorical change. While both the 2010 and the 2014 Regulations make non-
compliance with any of the regulations a criminal offence, the 2014 offence is more 
robustly framed than the 2010 offence. Regulation 27(2) (2010) provides that 
proceedings cannot be brought against a provider for failure to meet the 
requirements of any of the regulations unless the CQC has already issued a warning 
notice to the provider, alongside a timeframe for improvement, and they have not in 
fact improved. While it was possible for an offence to be committed, it was practically 
                                               
13
 Regulation 12, 2010 Regulations  
14
 Regulation 15, 2014 Regulations 
15
 Regulation 12, 2014 Regulations 
16
 Regulation 20, 2014 Regulations 
17
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difficult for the CQC to prosecute. The 2014 Regulations appear to have addressed 
the problem by removing these practical barriers. 
 
(B) The Mid Staffordshire fiasco 
Identifying a policy fiasco is difficult to do with certainty.18 On any measure however, 
the events at Stafford Hospital were a policy fiasco. The Healthcare Commission 
investigated unexpectedly high mortality rates at Stafford Hospital between 2005 and 
2008.19 They found ‘deficiencies at virtually every stage of the pathway of emergency 
care’20  including triage being performed by unqualified receptionists, shortage of 
doctors and nurses, and considerable pressure on staff to meet targets. 
Management had failed to notice the high mortality rates, or to scrutinise the 
hospital’s care. Robert Francis QC chaired a public inquiry in 2010-2013. The report 
found ‘appalling suffering’ and ‘an insidious negative culture involving a tolerance of 
poor standards and a disengagement from managerial and leadership 
responsibilities’.21 Francis called for a fundamental change to NHS culture. The Mid 
Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust, which managed Stafford Hospital, was 
dissolved on 1 November 2014, and its services were transferred to other NHS 
Trusts.22  
 
                                               
18
 M Bovens, and ‘t Hart P, Understanding Policy Fiascoes (Transaction, London 1996), 1-19 
19




 Healthcare Commission, ibid, 7. 
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 Francis note 2, 3 
22
 See ‘Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust’ at 
<https://www.midstaffs.nhs.uk/Home.aspx>  
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The regulatory framework had failed to identify the substandard care at Stafford 
Hospital, which caused deaths and significant harm. Specifically, while the 
Healthcare Commission 23  was commended for its 2009 review identifying the 
problems, it was also criticised for its lack of independence from the Department of 
Health, its reliance on self-reporting in annual health checks of providers and its 
willingness to rely on assurances from the NHS Trust. 24  One problem was the 
‘confusing mixture’ 25  of applicable standards encompassing several different and 
conflicting concepts. Francis criticised the CQC for ‘over-bureaucratic’ guidance 
which ‘fail[ed] to separate clearly what is absolutely essential from that which is 
merely desirable’. 26  The situation at Stafford Hospital was highly complex. It 
implicated individuals at four different levels, caregivers, managers, supervisors and 
regulators. It further implicated the regulatory system itself. Failures can – and do – 
happen at all of these levels. Successful regulation must recognise and address 
failings across all these stages.  
 
Crises are important for analysing regulatory change because they can punctuate the 
incremental nature of policy development, and lead to dramatic organisational 
changes.27 One risk of regulating in crisis management mode is that it can result in 
‘knee-jerk responses’ that leave ‘cumbersome and inappropriate regulatory 
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 The predecessor body to the CQC. 
24
 Francis, note 2, 55 
25
 Francis, note 2, 54 
26
 Francis, note 2, 58 
27
 A Boin and ‘t Hart P, ‘Public leadership in times of crisis: Mission impossible?’ (2003) 63 
Public Administration Review 544-553; M Lodge and Hood C, ‘Pavlovian policy responses to 
media feeding frenzies? Dangerous dogs regulation.’ (2002) 10 Comparative Perspectives 1-
13. 
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tombstones’ after the crisis has faded.28 Alternatively, it is argued that crises create a 
window of opportunity 29  for a government to implement a previously developed 
policy. It is evident here that the government did not have a ready-made policy 
waiting for implementation. It is also clear that the 2014 Regulations were not a knee-
jerk response. Delegating responsibility for a public inquiry to Sir Robert Francis QC 
created breathing space for the government to decide on its response, since any 
policy would have to consider the Francis report. Instead, the effect was to lock the 
government into implementing Francis’ recommendations. The question that arises is 
how a carefully considered, thoughtful policy change can be as flawed as a knee-jerk 
response.  
 
To address this issue, I start by considering two case studies from the 2014 
Regulations – the duty of candour, and the new criminal offence of causing or 
exposing patients to the risk of harm in relation to nutritional and hydration needs. 
These two types of provisions form the backbone of the 2014 Regulations. I show 
that the fundamental flaws in their substantive content stymie Francis’ aim of raising 
standards across the board. Next, I consider two larger structural concerns with the 
2014 Regulations – their reliance on criminal law and its expressive function to 
regulate as complex a field as healthcare. I argue that this fails to take into account 
enforcement practices, which have a dramatic effect on the success of new legal 
provisions. Drawing on notions of expressive power and regulatory enforcement 
theory, I offer a diagnosis of why a structured and considered public inquiry process 
might have produced seriously flawed regulations. I argue that this resulted from the 
political context surrounding the regulations, creating a tombstone to past disasters 
hindered by such shortcomings that they cannot accomplish the original aims. While 
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 Lodge and Hood note 27, 1 
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 J Kingdon, Agendas, alternatives and public policies (Harper Collins, New York 1995) 
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the literature on tombstones is more usually applied to knee-jerk responses, I 
demonstrate that it can offer some insight into the reasons carefully considered 
policy responses might also suffer from fatal flaws. 
 
(A) The duty of candour and mandated apologies 
Regulation 20 is a significant addition to healthcare regulation. The duty of candour 
requires health service bodies to ‘act in an open and transparent way with [patients 
or those acting lawfully on their behalf]30 in relation to care and treatment provided’.31 
Specifically, where there has been an ‘unintended or unexpected incident’ that did or 
could have resulted in the patient’s death or caused them to suffer moderate or 
severe harm, or prolonged psychological harm32 the health service body must notify33 
the patient or their legal representative about the incident and ‘provide reasonable 
support’34 . The Regulations require the notification to be ‘given in person’35  and 
followed up in writing. 36  The in-person notification must be given as soon as 
reasonably practicable after the health service body became aware of the incident.37 
It must provide an account of the facts known,38 advise the patient about the further 
enquiries to be made,39 and include an apology.40 The written follow up must contain 
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 Regulation 20(7), 2014 Regulations 
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 Regulation 20(1), 2014 Regulations 
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 Regulation 20(7), 2014 Regulations 
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 Regulation 20(2)(a), 2014 Regulations  
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 Regulation 20(2)(b), 2014 Regulations 
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 Regulation 20(3)(a), 2014 Regulations 
36
 Regulation 20(4), 2014 Regulations 
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 Regulation 20(3)(b), 2014 Regulations 
39
 Regulation 20(3)(c), 2014 Regulations 
40
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information about the facts surrounding the incident,41 details about any enquiries 
that have been carried out,42  the results of those enquiries,43  and an apology. 44 
Apology is defined as ‘an expression of sorrow or regret’.45 The duty of candour is 
backed by criminal sanctions. Failure to notify a patient about an incident which did 
or could have resulted in death or moderate or severe harm, and failure to apologise 
for that incident both amount to a breach of the regulation, carrying a penalty of a 
£2,500 fine following summary conviction.46  
 
This is the first time the law of England and Wales has required transparency about 
healthcare errors.47  This complements information provision at the doctor-patient 
level. Montgomery held that patients should be informed prior to making a treatment 
decision about ‘material risks’ that a ‘reasonable person in the patient’s position 
would attach significance to’ and ‘reasonable alternative and variant treatments’.48 
There is an explicit move away from treating patients paternalistically by withholding 
information in their own interests. Instead, the law expects greater openness and 
transparency in information provision, enabling patients to be more autonomous 
when interacting with healthcare providers. Francisrecommended a statutory duty of 
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 Regulation 20(4)(a), 2014 Regulations 
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 Regulation 20(4)(b), 2014 Regulations 
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 Regulation 20(4)(c), 2014 Regulations 
44
 Regulation 20(4)(d), 2014 Regulations 
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 Regulation 22(3), 23(6), 2014 Regulations 
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 Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. This is a fine at level 4 on 
the standard scale. 
47
 The 2014 Regulations were made under the power found in section 20 of the Health and 
Social Care Act 2008, which applies in England and Wales only, see Health and Social Care 
Act 2008, s 1969. 
48
 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, [87] 
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candour about post-treatment care49  as a direct response to the failures at Stafford 
Hospitals, and in the absence of these failures, it seems unlikely that this duty would 
have been enacted. 
 
Francis was clear that only a statutory duty of candour would solve the ‘culture of 
denial, secrecy and concealment of issues of concern’50 evident in the NHS. The 
Inquiry found that the piecemeal candour regime in professional guidance was 
unsatisfactory. The various healthcare professions were subject to substantially 
different obligations and sanctions, while NHS managers had a vague obligation with 
no definable sanctions. Other parts of the NHS were under no obligation at all.51 A 
duty of candour had been considered in Lee v SW Thames Regional Health 
Authority52 and in Naylor v Preston Area Health Authority53 but Lord Donaldson’s 
obiter comments did nothing to found any duty of candour, which would have been a 
dramatic expansion of tort law. 54  Subsequently, various recommendations were 
made about contractually or statutorily formalising a service-wide duty, by the Health 
Select Committee 199955, the Bristol Royal Infirmary inquiry56, the Shipman Inquiry57, 
                                               
49
 Francis, note 2, 104 
50
 Robert Francis QC, Report of the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry 




 [1985] 2 All ER 385, 389 (CA) 
53
 [1987] 2 All ER 353, 360 
54
 See Powell v Boldadz [1998] Lloyds Rep Med 116 
55
 House of Commons, Sixth Report: Procedures Related to Adverse Clinical Incidents and 
Outcomes in Medical Care (28 October 1999)  
<www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199899/cmselect/cmhealth/549/54902.htm>   
56
 Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry, The report of the public inquiry into children’s heart surgery 
at the Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984-1995: learning from Bristol (Cm 5207, 2001) 
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the Chief Medical Officer58 and the Health Select Committee 201159. None were 
explicitly acted upon. Instead, several different – non-complementary – policies were 
introduced by different bodies creating the piecemeal regime in place prior to the 
2014 Regulations. The Francis Inquiry sought witness evidence on its effectiveness. 
The evidence suggested that the provisions should be effective, but actually failed to 
take into account human behaviour. The government’s failure to back up guidance 
with enforcement meant that secrecy was being tolerated and perpetuated across 
the NHS. 60  Much of the witness evidence favoured a statutory duty, while the 
Department of Health was non-committal. Francis concluded that nothing short of a 
weighty statutory duty could overturn the ingrained culture of secrecy, such that 
candour would ‘permeate and inform everything that is done when providing 
healthcare to the public’.61 
 
Apologies are central to the duty of candour. Failure to apologise in person or in 
subsequent writing would breach the duty. Much research has explored the nature of 
                                                                                                                                      
Recommendation 33, p 441  
 
57
 Shipman Inquiry: The Fifth Report – Safeguarding Patients: Lessons from the Past – 
Proposals for the Future (9 December 2004) 916 [24.151], and 1146, [27.199] 
58
 Sir Liam Donaldson, Making amends: a consultation paper setting out proposals for 
reforming the approach to clinical negligence in the NHS: A report by the Chief Medical 
Officer (30 June 2003)   
59
 House of Commons Health Committee, Complaints and Litigation Sixth Report of Session 
2010–12 (23 June 2011), paras 80–82, Conclusions and recommendations paras 21–22  
60
 Francis, note 50, 1486-1488 
61
 Francis, note 50, [22.160] 
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apologies, and their role in the legal sphere.62 O’Hara explains that ‘an effective 
apology requires (1) identification of the wrongful act; (2) expression of remorse and 
regret for having committed the act; (3) promise to forbear from committing the 
wrongful act in the future; and (4) offer of repair.’63 She suggests that an effective 
apology requires the transgressor to engage in self-humiliation, to ‘place himself in a 
morally inferior position’64 regarding the failure and its victim. Apologies which meet 
these conditions can help dissipate the victim’s anger, and crucially, temper any 
inclination to bring legal action. 65  Adding apologies into the NHS complaints 
procedure might reduce the already significant burden of lawsuits. In 2014-2015, the 
NHS Litigation Authority paid over £1.1 billion to claimants and their legal 
representatives, with a third going to the legal profession. This is expected to 
increase to £1.4 billion in the next year.66 The Chief Executive suggested that the 
                                               
62
 See for example, H Wagatsuma and A Rosett, “The implications of apology: Law and 
culture in Japan and the United States” (1986) 20 Law and Society Review 461; A Allan, 
“Apology in civil law: A psycho-legal perspective” (2007) 14 Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 
5; M Bismark, ‘The power of apology’ (2009) 122 The New Zealand Medical Journal 96; L 
Taft, ‘Apology and medical mistake: Opportunity or foil?’ (2005) 14 Annals of Health Law 55; 
S McLennan, S Walker and LE Rich, ‘Should health care providers be forced to apologise 
after things go wrong?’ (2014) 11 Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 431; S Raper, ‘No role for 
apology: Remedial work and the problem of medical injury’ (2011) 11 Yale Journal of Health 
Policy, Law and Ethics 267. 
63
 EA O’Hara, ‘Apology and thick trust: What spouse abusers and negligent doctors might 
have in common’ (2004) 70 Chicago-Kent Law Review 1055, 1064. 
64
 O’Hara, ibid, 1065. 
65
 D Wojcieszak, J Banda, and C Houk, ‘The Sorry Works! Coalition: Making the case for full 
disclosure’ (2006) 32 Journal on Quality and Patient Safety 344-450 
66




‘emergence of non-specialist lawyers coupled with excessive claims for legal costs’67 
had had a significant impact on cost. While complaints are inevitable, these sums of 
money are not. Changes to the legal framework which might reduce the number of 
claims initiated could help lighten this burden. 
 
The duty of candour applies to health service bodies, not individual staff members. 
But the CQC require health service bodies to ensure that there is a culture of 
openness and transparency amongst their staff.68  This includes having a robust 
policy, appropriate training available, and a culture encouraging openness. This puts 
pressure on the individual to comply with the duty of candour, and non-compliance 
might amount to a disciplinary offence or an action outside the employment context 
which would entail a refusal of vicarious liability in any claim against the individual 
concerned. The regulations are concerned with the health service body’s apology. 
Zwart-Hink et al argue that a public body’s apology is significant because it 
acknowledges that the social contract has been violated.69 The Stafford Hospital 
fiasco was compounded by the institutional failure to take responsibility. By 
mandating the institutional apology, regulation 20 mandates the institutional 
acknowledgement of errors. It sets no requirements about who must give the in-
person apology, except that they must represent the institution.70 It would be possible 
for institutions to augment the power of their apology by requiring the patient’s 
consultant to make a personal apology alongside a member of hospital management 
                                               
67
 Ibid, 6. 
68
 CQC, Regulation 20: Duty of Candour: Information for all providers: NHS bodies, adult 
social care, primary medical and dental care, and independent healthcare March 2015 at 
<http://www.cqc.org.uk/sites/default/files/20150327_duty_of_candour_guidance_final.pdf> 10. 
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 A Zwart-Hink, Akkermans A, and Van Wees K, ‘Compelled apologies as a legal remedy: 
Some thoughts from a civil law jurisdiction’ (2014-2015) 38 U W Austl L Rev 100, 120 
70
 Regulation 20(3)(a), 2014 Regulations 
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making the institutional apology. If the personal apology is sufficiently credible, with 
the appropriate levels of remorse and self-humiliation, it will give further impact to the 
institutional acknowledgement of the failure. If an individual health practitioner is to 
offer apologies, then it will be necessary for the institution to clarify the relationship 
and the individual’s power to take responsibility for the institution. 
 
If this duty becomes a de facto individual duty, or individual healthcare practitioners 
are required to make apologies on behalf of the institution, it places individuals under 
inappropriate pressure. Medical professional guidance does not mandate apologies 
instead leaving the decision to apologise to the doctor. GMC guidance in 200671 
required doctors to ‘act immediately to put things right’ where harm or distress was 
caused. Where patients complained they had ‘a right to expect a prompt, open, 
constructive and honest response including an explanation and, if appropriate, an 
apology’. No guidance was offered on when an apology would be appropriate. This 
guidance continued in Good Medical Practice 2013,72 which provides that doctors 
‘must respond promptly, fully and honestly to complaints and apologise when 
appropriate’.73 No further guidance is given on when an apology would be considered 
appropriate. If a doctor decided to apologise then section 2 of the Compensation Act 
2006 provided that an apology was not an admission of negligence. Apologies by 
individuals are powerful. That power comes from both the sentiment and the reasons 
for it. This power is undermined by insincerity, since one purpose of an apology is the 
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 General Medical Council, Good Medical Practice (2013) at <http://www.gmc-
uk.org/guidance/good_medical_practice.asp> [61]  
73
 General Medical Council 2013, at <http://www.gmc-
uk.org/guidance/good_medical_practice/treat_fairly.asp>  
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forgiveness necessary to continue a relationship.74 An expression of ‘genuine regret, 
responsibility and intention to change can only be generated by the person 
concerned’. 75  Power comes from the personal connection, from the patient’s 
understanding of the doctor’s remorse, and from the doctor internalising that 
remorse. Mandating individual apologies undermines, and ultimately removes, the 
essential characteristic of genuineness. It undermines the patient-doctor relationship 
of trust and confidence. Where candour policies require an individual to make the 
apology, it is essential that the institution clarifies the limits of the relationship, and 
that the apologiser is authorised to and is explicitly acting on behalf of the institution, 
rather than in a personal capacity. 
 
The rest of the provision focusing on openness, transparency and honesty in 
communicating about failures, could do real good. A statutory duty to inform patients 
about failures is easy to fulfil, despite historical evidence to the contrary. The difficult 
part is taking responsibility. Giving factual information to patients promptly and 
honestly empowers them to make decisions about the future. It engenders trust in 
healthcare professionals as human beings since it reminds us that things go wrong. 
Lopez et al showed that disclosure of errors led to higher quality ratings of care.76 
While the law cannot instantly change cultures, this duty helps to embed 
explanations into healthcare provision. Ultimately, this should help to encourage a 
culture of openness throughout the NHS.  
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 Zwart-Hink note 69, 120 
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The duty of candour featured in 13 of Francis’ 290 recommendations. Neither the 
word nor the notion of apology appears at all. Francis’ duty of candour centred 
around full disclosure,77 honest and truthful responses to questions,78 and properly 
supporting patients receiving a disclosure.79 His justification was that doing it properly 
‘requires insight into personal and organisational deficiencies’ and ‘a determination to 
put right what has gone wrong’.80 While candour can have benefits for patients and 
healthcare provision generally, the Stafford Hospital fiasco showed that failings in 
candour had serious consequences, such as delays in bereaved relatives learning 
about their loved ones’ deaths, and a general failure to correct deficient service.81 
While the framework in the Compensation Act 2006 and the GMC’s ethical duty of 
candour was good in theory, it had not worked in practice. Francis’ challenge was to 
increase compliance. The parts of regulation 20 that relate to candour, ie, information 
provision, could be successful. The problem is that if institutional policies on 
apologising blur the boundary between personal and institutional apologies, it could 
lead to apologies appearing insincere, which could do considerable damage to the 
institutional position, and ultimately to the duty of candour itself. 
 
(A) Meeting nutritional and hydration needs 
The second significant development is the new criminal offence, committed by 
breaching fundamental standards relating to safe care and treatment,82 abuse and 
improper treatment,83 or nutritional and hydration needs84, and that breach results in: 
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 Francis, note 2, recommendation 174  
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 Francis, note 2, recommendation 173, and 175 
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 Francis, note 2, recommendation 174 
80
 Robert Francis QC, Report of the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry 
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 Francis volume 3, ibid, 1489 
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 Regulation 12, 2014 Regulations 
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(a) avoidable harm (whether of a physical or psychological nature) to a service 
user, 
(b) a service user being exposed to a significant risk of such harm occurring, or 
(c) in the case of theft, misuse or appropriation of money or property, any loss by 
a service user of the money or property concerned85 
 
It is punishable by a fine not exceeding £50,000 after summary conviction.86 
 
Hospital food provision is a useful context to explore this new offence. Regulation 14 
provides that ‘the nutritional and hydration needs of service users must be met’. 
Needs are defined as: 
 
(a) receipt by a service user of suitable and nutritious food and hydration which is 
adequate to sustain life and good health, 
(b) receipt by a service user of parenteral nutrition and dietary supplements when 
prescribed by a health care professional, 
                                                                                                                                      
83
 Regulation 13, 2014 Regulations 
84
 Regulation 14, 2014 Regulations 
85
 Regulation 22(2), 2014 Regulations 
86
 Regulation 23(4), 2014 Regulations, which applies where section 85(2) of the Legal Aid, 
Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 is not in force on 6 November 2014, see 
regulation 23(3), 2014 Regulations. Section 85(2) of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and 
Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 came into force on 12 March 2015, see Article 2 of The 
Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (Commencement No. 11) 
Order 2015. 
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(c) the meeting of any reasonable requirements of a service user for food and 
hydration arising from the service user’s preferences or their religious or 
cultural background, and  
(d) if necessary, support for a service user to eat or drink.87 
 
Regulation 14 applies where the service provider provides accommodation or an 
overnight stay, or where food and drink is provided as part of other services.88 It does 
not apply where the service user refuses to accept food and drink provided, since 
care and treatment can only be provided with the consent of the service user89 or 
where providing nutrition and hydration would not be in the service user’s best 
interests90 to be determined with reference to the Mental Capacity Act 2005.91  
 
Prima facie, this offence is broad. Patients must receive nutritious and sustaining 
food, which meets their preferences, religious or cultural background, and be 
supported in eating if necessary. If this does not happen, and the patient suffers 
physical or psychological harm, or is put at risk of such harm, then the offence is 
committed. However, several of the criteria are subject to legitimate differences in 
interpretation, which could narrow its application.  
 
First is the definition of ‘nutritious and sustaining’. This appears to be an objective 
measure, since it is independent from the requirement that the food meets the 
patient’s preferences. It is unclear how this will be measured. It could be assessed by 
considering whether there is an appropriate balance of important nutrients, such as 
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protein, carbohydrates, fibre, vitamins, and fat. It might be the number of calories 
provided, which could be referenced against the average recommended daily calorie 
consumption. It might also be important to take into account salt and sugar content, 
and the presence of E numbers. There are many different recommendations for the 
appropriate balance between the different nutrients. The ‘eatwell plate’ recommends 
plenty of fruit and vegetables, plenty of starchy foods such as bread, potatoes, pasta 
or rice, some milk and dairy foods, some non-dairy protein such as meat, fish, eggs 
or beans, and a small amount of foods that are high in fat or sugar.92 The three part 
scale – plenty, some, just a little – is mapped onto a plate to indicate how much 
space the food should take up. No specific figures or objective measures are 
provided. A second way might be to use the calorie count, but this is a flawed 
measure of nutritional value. It does not account for the processing that food has 
undergone. The calorie count for raw and cooked carrots are identical. However, 
more calories are available to the body in cooked carrot. Our bodies have to work 
harder to extract calories from raw carrot.93 The best way to evaluate nutrition would 
be an amalgam of several measures, since no one single measure is sufficiently 
definitive. The choice of interpretation measure will narrow or broaden the application 
of the offence.  
 
These measures provide a result for the average person. They do not take illness 
into account. Patients may have specific issues dictating specific nutritional needs, 
such as being under or overweight. Ill people need more calories to promote their 
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healing.94 Even if a patient is otherwise healthy and eats a normal diet, the reason for 
their presence in hospital might indicate that a dietary change is necessary. One 
group of particular concern is the elderly, who have specific nutritional needs but may 
not feel motivated to eat. When elderly patients are admitted to hospital, they tend to 
become more ill, which is exacerbated by inadequate nutrition. Malnourished patients 
are also more likely to die earlier than well-nourished patients.95 Perhaps the only 
way of approaching nutritional value is to reference it to the individual patient’s 
needs. This makes it difficult to create a uniformly applicable standard. 
 
The next definitional issue arises in relation to ‘sustaining’, which seems to mean 
something different from ‘nutritious’. While ‘nutritious’ can be defined using objective 
measures, ‘sustaining’ implies a qualitative question of whether food is appealing, 
and whether it satisfies the emotional aspects of food consumption. Good food 
satisfies the body’s need for fuel, and the mind’s need for stimulation. Ultimately, 
whether food is nutritious and sustaining is a subjective question, which cannot be 
fulfilled with a simple calorie count, or other quantitative measure. This would not be 
an easy view for a court to reach, and doing so would create a significant burden of 
work for inspectors and providers. These practical issues might lead a court to 
choose an easily measurable and replicable objective scale, such as a 
straightforward calorie count. 
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Food must meet the reasonable needs of patients arising from their preferences, 
religious or cultural background. The issue here is reasonableness. People make 
accepted dietary choices – veganism – significantly limiting the food available to 
them in hospital. It is unclear how far these choices must be accommodated by the 
new fundamental standards. A more concerning conceptual problem is that 
regulation 14 appears to equate preferences with religious and cultural dietary rules. 
Arguably, there is a difference between a strict Muslim choosing only to consume 
Halal food, and a non-religious person choosing not to eat tomatoes. The religious 
rule appears to give the food preference greater weight. Reasonableness could be 
used to distinguish between them, such that preferences based in religious or 
cultural values are more likely to be considered reasonable than preferences which 
are not. However, food preferences also depend on taste. There is variation in the 
range of foods that people like, and it might not be unreasonable for a person to 
choose only to eat food that they enjoy. 
 
There is significant room for manoeuvre within the definition of ‘nutritional and 
hydration needs’. Given this level of uncertainty, it is unclear whether it would be 
practically possible to find a breach of these standards, let alone prosecute. 
 
The second stage is also open to interpretation, potentially increasing the breadth of 
the offence. First is the requirement that the patient suffers from avoidable physical 
or psychological harm. Avoidability implies that the failure to meet the patient’s 
nutritional and hydration needs caused the harm. An obvious harm would be 
dehydration caused by failure to provide sufficient fluids, or vitamin deficiency caused 
by failure to provide sufficient fruit and vegetables. A breach might occur if food 
exacerbates an existing condition. For example, a patient with gall bladder issues 
should avoid high fat meals that might trigger an attack, which can lead to further 
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problems.96 If high fat food were eaten and it did trigger an attack, this would be 
avoidable harm. It is less clear regarding psychological harm. It may be successful if 
a person with a severe phobia of fruit was repeatedly provided with fruits, and this 
caused him to suffer anxiety and an exacerbation of his phobia. This psychological 
harm could have been avoided had his nutritional needs been met. In reality it will be 
difficult to satisfactorily meet this element of the offence. It depends on proving that a 
medical condition is avoidable, and that it would have been avoided except for the 
failure to provide appropriate food, or the provision of inappropriate food. This implies 
that there is a clear understanding of food’s role in medicine. This is not the case. 
 
The offence is also committed where the patient is exposed to the risk of physical or 
psychological harm. This broadens the offence by not requiring actual harm. This is 
open to interpretation. There is no indication what level of risk will amount to a 
breach. For example, failure to provide complete ingredient lists creates a risk that a 
patient will suffer from a serious allergic reaction, since they will not be aware 
whether the meal contains a particular allergen. This is a vanishingly small risk, albeit 
one with potentially harmful consequences. It might be easier to show a failure where 
the food provision could affect an existing condition. For example, failure to provide 
or adequately identify gluten-free menu choices risks exacerbating coeliac disease. 
The question is about the extent to which hypothetical or theoretical risks are 
included. It could be a broad, easily breachable standard. 
 
Focusing on physical and psychological harm ignores harm that arises from failure to 
observe religious needs. Serving non-compliant food to strict practitioners is unlikely 
to cause or risk causing physical or psychological harm within the accepted 
definitions. It might be best described as an attack on personal or religious identity, 
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which is not caught by regulation 14. Treatment of this nature may fall at the 
intersection of regulations 14 and 10, requiring that service users should be treated 
with dignity and respect. Regulation 10 does not carry the same criminal provisions 
as regulation 14, indicating that this harm is not considered to be as serious as 
physical or recognised psychological harm. However, it may feel worse for the 
individual involved. 
 
On its face, the new offence relating to food provision is more stringent than the 2010 
offence. It carries a more significant penalty, and it is easier to bring a prosecution. 
However, the scope for considerable variation in interpreting the standards 
themselves is a concern. In the first instance, CQC inspections will establish the 
boundaries of the standards. A legal ruling will only be possible if a prosecution is 
brought, and a point of law is appealed to the High Court from the magistrates’ 
decision. This seems unlikely. 
 
(A) A litany of flaws? 
These case studies illustrate the tone and potential impact of the new regulations. 
Understanding their impact relies on understanding the wider context surrounding 
their introduction. Stafford Hospital saw one of the worst healthcare failures in 
England and Wales. This was due to the actions of individual healthcare workers, 
and failures in the regulatory oversight mechanisms. Both the CQC and the 
Healthcare Commission were criticised for their parts in allowing the abuses to 
continue unchecked. This was a failure on all fronts. Any analysis of the 2014 
Regulations must take this political context into account. 
 
I have argued in the case studies above, that the focus on mandated apology 
undermines the duty of candour, which focuses on openness and transparency about 
errors. The scope for different interpretations of the criminal offence in the context of 
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nutrition and hydration means that the 2014 Regulations give no clear indication 
when and how the offence could be prosecuted. Both measures have fundamental 
flaws which could result in their individual failure. Taking the measures together, 
there are two further concerns that indicate that the regulations may fail. The first is 
the increased use of the criminal law to regulate complex issues of healthcare 
delivery, and the second is the CQC’s capacity to effectively enforce the new regime. 
 
(B) The criminal law 
What is the purpose of invoking the criminal law to regulate healthcare provision? 
Francis seeks ‘a relentless focus on the patient’s interests and the obligation to keep 
patients safe and protected from substandard care’.97 The 2014 Regulations’ aim 
appears to be a general increase in the NHS standard of care. While both Quick98 
and Yeung and Horder 99  have argued that the role of the criminal law is its 
expressive function, it is unlikely to raise the general standard of care. Infrequent, 
high-profile prosecutions of egregious behaviour can set clear examples of what will 
and will not be tolerated, ‘A criminal conviction amounts to a public proclamation that 
the conduct in question is seriously wrongful and worthy of condemnation and 
punishment, whether or not it leads directly to a substantial improvement in 
healthcare quality.’100 They suggest that the reason for bringing criminal prosecutions 
for the events at Stafford Hospital is ‘because [the criminal law] is the most powerful 
and important social institution through which we hold to account, and express public 
censure of, those who have mistreated others in a wholly unacceptable and highly 
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culpable way.’ 101  Criminal prosecutions focus on the particular behaviour of the 
individual or institution. Wider social issues, and the potential impact of the 
prosecution, are expressly irrelevant to the prosecution itself. Prosecutions are 
brought because the person or institution acted in a culpable manner which deserves 
the censure of society.  
 
Sunstein defines an expressive law as one that requires ‘certain forms of behaviour 
through statutory requirements accompanied by significant enforcement activity’.102 
This might lead to a general raising of standards if it changes regulatees’ behaviour. 
Thornton, Gunningham and Kagan103 considered the claim that a few high-profile 
convictions increased corporate compliance with environmental protection laws. 
They found the opposite. While the majority of firms reported taking different actions 
after hearing about prosecutions, they estimated that only 10-20 per cent of firms 
were actually responding to another firm’s prosecution. 104  While individuals who 
recalled more of the high-profile prosecutions did perceive a greater risk of being 
prosecuted for non-compliance, this did not translate into more compliance activities 
being undertaken. 105  They did not find a simple direct link between a few 
prosecutions and a general increase in standards. Instead, high-profile prosecutions 
merely reminded already compliant regulatees to remain so. Where a prosecution 
was unexpected, it allowed regulatees to reassure themselves that they were 
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compliant even where another firm was not.106 At best, they found that regulatees 
had a greater perception of the possibility of prosecution, but this did not affect their 
behaviour, and there was no change to the general standards. Extrapolating to 
healthcare regulation, it is unlikely that a few high-profile prosecutions under the 
2014 Regulations could improve standards. They will operate as a reminder that 
another Stafford Hospital fiasco will not be tolerated, while saying nothing about 
behaviour falling short. Most institutions are generally compliant with the rules, and 
they would be able to distance themselves from the widespread abuses at Stafford 
Hospital. It may not prompt them to examine their own performance, but instead 
simply confirm their compliance. 
 
The criminal offences supporting regulation 14 and 20 may be the ‘significant 
enforcement activity’ required by Sunstein for an effective expressive law. However, 
the flexibility of regulation 14 makes it difficult to bring a prosecution or achieve a 
conviction. The CQC is clear that regulation 20 will be enforced where necessary, but 
since this is a new regulation and they are learning about how it will work, they will be 
taking a proportionate view on its application in different clinical settings.107 Francis 
indicates that the CQC is expected to prosecute as a last resort only ‘in cases of 
serial non-compliance or serious and wilful deception’.108 Since the fine for a single 
breach is £2,500109 this could only be a significant penalty if the full fine was imposed 
for every breach. Neither of these amount to ‘significant enforcement activity’. At 
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best, the expressive power is in the statement about the intolerability of behaviour 
caught by the regulations. To what extent can an expressive law not supported by 
‘significant enforcement activity’ effect a general raising in standards? Sunstein 
argues that merely expressive laws rely on social norms. He considers cleaning up 
dog mess in the US. 110  These rules are largely unenforced, and carry nominal 
penalties when they are enforced. People clean up their dog’s mess because the 
presence of the rules indicates social disapproval of failure to clean up. Also, 
widespread advertising of these rules in places where dog fouling is most likely to 
occur increases the pressure by making it difficult to claim an unawareness of the 
rules. How might this apply in the case of healthcare provision?  
 
Healthcare provision decisions might be made by an individual or a committee, but 
ultimately, people are responsible. People working in hospital management want 
their hospital to succeed, their patients to be well looked after, and their institution to 
be thought well of. They want to comply. If we look at Braithwaite and Braithwaite’s 
study comparing care home regulation in the US and Australia111, we see that a 
regulatory framework based around a small number of broad principles forced 
regulatees to think behind the principles and work out for themselves how best to 
meet them. This led to a more subjective service that better met the needs of 
residents. The 2014 Regulations take this approach. The provisions are broad, and 
the CQC guidance on how to comply urges providers to think about how the 
provisions will apply to their own institution. They harness the notion that providers 
want to engage and comply with the principles. There are relevant social norms 
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within the community of hospital management that point towards compliance with the 
regulations, even where the potential for enforcement activity might be limited.  
 
The circumstances surrounding the NHS differs materially from those faced by 
Braithwaite and Braithwaite’s care home providers. The NHS faces an acute 
budgetary crisis. Thus these social norms compete with a need to control spending. 
In an ideal world, providers would want to provide outstanding care and meet the 
standards at the highest level possible. This world is not ideal. These social norms 
are not the only consideration. The NHS is expensive. Its budget is limited. The 
budgets of individual NHS Trusts are limited. It is not possible to provide a platinum 
standard of care on a brass budget. Hospital managers must get the best care they 
can for the money they have available, and this might mean cutting expenditure on 
food, to spend more on cardiac surgery. The obvious way to do this is to contract out. 
Contracts should effectively deal with the quality standards. Where the service fails 
to meet the terms, the institution would have an action in contract against the 
contractor. If there were a real prospect of CQC enforcement it would weigh in the 
balance in the compromise between high-quality services and cost-saving. Where 
there are these competing imperatives, the regulatory framework must provide a 
stark minimum level that must be met, and if it is to have any effect on the decisions 
made, it must limit, through the potential for enforcement action, the power that the 
imperative to cost-save has in any calculation. Regulation 14 fails to do that. 
 
The interplay of norms surrounding the duty of candour is different. The social 
approval of openness and transparency about errors, and the social disapproval of 
secrecy expressed by regulation 20 is given greater weight by its history. The culture 
of secrecy at Stafford Hospital exacerbated the fiasco, and drew Francis’ wrath. The 
duty of candour carries more weight than other regulations. The CQC are tentative 
about their enforcement agenda due to the newness of the provision, so there is 
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scope for providers to lead the way in compliance policies. Any credible attempt to 
comply will contribute to the CQC’s understanding of how the regulation should be 
applied and enforced. For providers with clear views on how this should work, there 
is a strong incentive to work on their institution’s approach early. An argument often 
made is that apology rules can help to reduce the amount of litigation brought, since 
patients will be satisfied with an apology and an assurance that this event will not 
happen again.112 If this is the case, then this is another incentive in favour of having a 
robust policy favouring openness and apology. Balanced against this is the potential 
reputational damage coming from taking responsibility for poor practice outside the 
official complaints procedure or court proceedings. A high number of apologies might 
make it necessary to scrutinise institutional practices. Alternatively, the reputational 
damage associated with non-compliance might be more damaging than that linked to 
a review of practice. Arguably, the expressive influence of the duty of candour has 
the potential to be more successful than the food provisions in spite of its lack of 
significant enforcement activity, because the norms in favour of compliance outweigh 
any competing motivation not to. 
 
These case studies show patchwork expressive power in the 2014 Regulations. The 
nutrition and hydration standards cannot succeed on their expressive power alone 
because the interplay of norms does not promote compliance. The duty of candour is 
different. It is Francis’ magic bullet. The focus on openness and transparency brings 
symbolic power. It is being taken seriously – policies are being written, training is 
being given, and it is a topic of discussion throughout the NHS. The duty of candour 
may have sufficient expressive power to address the lack of transparency about 
failures in the NHS. But, lack of transparency is not the only issue that the 2014 
Regulations are intended to address, and the duty of candour is not a panacea for all 
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ills. If I am right in arguing that the expressive power lies solely in the duty of 
candour, then it cannot effect the general increase of standards that Francis called 
for. 
 
(B) Can the Care Quality Commission enforce the Regulations? 
Ayres and Braithwaite’s enforcement pyramid113 embodies the notion of responsive 
regulation and is used to argue that command and control sanctions are not the only 
method of enforcing standards. Instead, there is a hierarchy of available enforcement 
powers, starting with the least onerous at the bottom, rising to the most burdensome 
at the top. Most enforcement work fits at the bottom of the pyramid, but regulators 
can and should move up when appropriate. The most serious powers should be used 
sparingly, where necessary and proportionate. Movement through the pyramid can 
go both ways. Where regulatees have complied with a more serious enforcement 
measure, regulators can return to lower levels for future interventions. 
 
The CQC has a raft of available enforcement measures. 114  Figure 2 shows an 
enforcement pyramid illustrating the full range. There is no requirement to start at the 
bottom of the pyramid and work up. They may start at any level. Inspectors consider 
two questions, 1) whether the impact of the concern is minor, moderate or major, and 
2) whether the likelihood of the events happening again is remote, possible or 
probable. 115  The answers are combined to decide whether concerns are low, 
medium, high or extreme seriousness, and help choose the appropriate enforcement 
mechanism. A minor impact and a remote chance of repeat is low seriousness, and 
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merits a light touch response, such as an informal collaborative arrangement to 
improve standards. A major impact with probable repetition merits a more serious 
response, such as urgent deregistration procedures and prosecution. Urgent 
procedures entail cancelling a registration and closing down a health service provider 
quickly, and is used when serious harm is caused to service users. Enforcement 
actions need not be applied consecutively. The most serious problems would merit 
using civil enforcement powers alongside criminal enforcement powers. In most 
cases, there will be a gradual escalation of enforcement activities, starting with a 
warning notice and re-inspection, then imposing conditions on registration, and finally 
prosecution for non-compliance with the conditions, if necessary.  
 
The 2014 Regulations enable CQC Inspectors to move more easily between levels of 
the pyramid. The 2010 Regulations provided that a prosecution could only be 
brought if a warning notice had been served alongside an improvement period.116 
This made prosecuting difficult. The 2014 Regulations remove this requirement. 
Prosecutions can be a starting measure in the most extreme cases of failure. This 
adds weight to the top of the pyramid, especially with the unlimited financial penalties 
available for some offences. Removing the requirement to start with a warning notice 
gives the CQC greater control over their enforcement strategy in each case.  
 
These changes fail to address institutional dimensions affecting enforcement. 
Particularly important are the institutional decision-making processes to draw the 
appropriate balance between compliance and deterrence measures. Hawkins117 has 
demonstrated that these affect the effectiveness of regulatory intervention in other 
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areas; yet the 2014 Regulations fail to deal with these dimensions. CQC inspector 
enforcement practices are as much a factor in the success of the new regulations as 
the provisions themselves. Neglecting ‘the inherent nature of the enforcement 
function’ contributes to regulatory failure.118 Inspectors necessarily have a great deal 
of discretion. Compliance methods – at the base of the pyramid – are more effective 
for managing ongoing relationships between the regulatee and the regulator, 
especially when breaches are not predictable. In the healthcare environment, the 
focus should be on correcting problems and creating a more stable approach for the 
future.119 The next failure is the bigger concern for patient safety. It is difficult to 
predict the next failure, especially where it falls outside the existing regulations. It is 
essential that institutions can disclose concerns to the CQC without fear of heavy 
handed prosecution, so that action may be taken to address potential future 
breaches. Compliance approaches to enforcement can help to foster this sort of 
openness.  
 
Properly tailoring enforcement actions to each institution requires an understanding 
of why regulatees comply. Baldwin’s taxonomy of regulatees indicates that different 
enforcement approaches will suit different regulatees. For example, the well-
intentioned and ill-informed regulatee is best dealt with through an educational and 
supportive approach, whereas the ill-intentioned and ill-informed regulatee is more 
likely to respond to a legalistic approach supported by the threat of the full weight of 
the law.120 Allowing inspectors to tailor their enforcement approach to the type of 
regulatee is fundamental to the Regulations’ success.121 In the NHS context there is 
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another relevant class, the budgetary constrained regulatee. At the end of 2014/15 
the NHS had a ‘net deficit of more than £800million’.122 Hawkins argues that cash-
strapped regulatees will not be motivated to go beyond basic compliance, doing only 
the minimum required.123 Where there is a suite of standards to be complied with to 
different extents, regulatees might prioritise particular aspects, and focus on the 
regulator’s particular concerns. The CQC is explicit in its focus on safety,124 indicating 
that the non-safety standards may be less likely to attract enforcement action, thus 
regulatees can be a little less concerned about strict compliance.  
 
In addition to understanding compliance, it is important to understand that non-
compliance is not simply failure to comply. Kagan and Scholz suggest that non-
compliance might be rational, principled or due to general organisational 
incompetence.125 The Stafford Hospital catastrophe was due to a systematic failure 
of management and oversight, and the culture of secrecy surrounding errors. It is 
more important to know about the state of managerial competence in large 
organisations than it is to identify individual intentions. Even the most well-intentioned 
and well-informed team will fail to comply if they are situated in a culture of 
incompetence and non-compliance. Rather than engage in enforcement activity, 
inspectors may need to act as consultants working with the institution to create 
competent management. It is unlikely that CQC inspection teams have the necessary 
expertise or resources to do this. Alternatively, it may be that local enforcement 
action is pointless in this sort of crisis, and that engendering a culture of openness, 
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transparency and asking for help, through high-level policy change such as the duty 
of candour might be more successful. It might be even more successful if regulatees 
are included in in forming enforcement policy. 
 
There are historical reasons why a compliance approach may not be acceptable to 
the CQC itself. Francis identified the 
 
systemic culture where organisations took inappropriate comfort from 
assurances given either by the Trust itself or from action taken by other 
regulatory organisations. As a result, organisations often failed to carry out 
sufficient scrutiny of information, instead treating these assurances as fulfilling 
their own, independent obligations.126  
 
The Healthcare Commission’s compliance approach contributed to the Stafford 
Hospital fiasco. Insufficient scrutiny alongside a culture of secrecy meant errors and 
failings were missed or unreported. Had the Healthcare Commission scrutinised 
more closely and taken more serious enforcement action, the crisis may have been 
caught sooner and been less serious overall. The new criminal offences and the 
greater freedom to prosecute indicates the 2014 Regulations’ aim to push a more 
deterrence-focused approach to enforcement, to prevent the possibility of regulatory 
capture. This strictness is a direct response to the failings of the more lenient 2010 
Regulations. While the framework in the 2014 Regulations clearly permits a 
compliance approach to enforcement – making it easier to move between levels in 
the pyramid, and allowing inspectors to start at any point on the pyramid – the tenor 
of the provisions is that stricter enforcement practices are necessary to prevent 
another Stafford Hospital. 
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This creates a mismatch between the inspectors’ role in maintaining ongoing 
relationships, calling for a compliance approach, and the 2014 Regulations, favouring 
a deterrence approach. The 2014 Regulations may push inspectors towards  
deterrence, even where compliance would be more appropriate. The deterrence 
approach assumes that regulatees are rational calculators, and that they comply to 
avoid penalties for non-compliance. The policy pushes inspectors to take this 
approach even where regulatees are differently motivated.127 It brings a legalistic 
threat of prosecution to the forefront. Bardach and Kagan have argued that while this 
has positively affected compliance, increased legalism can cause perverse 
reactions.128 It may lead to compliance experts taking up central management roles, 
moving focus from caring towards legalistic compliance. They argue that regulatees 
‘who think of themselves as trying to do a decent job are not likely to cooperate with 
an agency that in effect disregards their judgement and good-faith efforts or that 
even denies (by its actions) that they are to be trusted at all’. 129  This pushes 
regulatees towards a minimal compliance approach, removing any motivation to go 
above the standards set. This is problematic when the best patient care comes from 
a caring institution which is motivated to go beyond the minimum. The deterrence 
approach could turn the necessarily ongoing relationship between regulator and 
regulatee into one of hostility, further reducing the opportunity for the regulator to 
offer compliance advice, instead relying on prosecution and more formal measures. 
Hawkins argues that prosecution should be the last resort. Having to prosecute 
indicates ‘a failure of regulatory control’.130 Once a prosecution has been brought, 
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and relations have turned hostile, there is nowhere else to go. The regulator must 
continue to prosecute similar breaches or risk appearing arbitrary. This compounds 
the perception of regulator unreasonableness131 and cements the hostility. Bringing 
multiple prosecutions puts a significant financial burden on the regulator. Can the 
CQC can afford to follow the deterrence approach in the regulations? 
 
The CQC have changed their method of work; specifically a new inspection model, 
entailing a mixture of announced and unannounced inspections, and a change in the 
constitution of the inspection team, to be led by a CQC manager, chaired by an NHS 
clinician or executive, and including staff, patients, carers and experts by experience. 
This mix of new perspectives increases the chances of inspectors seeing problems, 
and reduces their need to rely on assurances. This indicates a move towards a 
deterrence approach. The new inspections consider whether the service is ‘safe, 
effective, caring, responsive to people’s needs and well-led’.132 Each of these are 
rated inadequate, requires improvement, good or outstanding. Ratings are published 
on the CQC’s website. The media are informed about inadequate and outstanding 
ratings and any enforcement actions and prosecutions.133 It is possible that reframing 
the inspection process has made it more efficient, so there is more budget available 
for enforcement action. However, prosecution is expensive, and the deterrence 
approach creates a need for more prosecutions. There will come a point when it is 
not financially viable to continue to prosecute. 
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The ideal approach to enforcement is a mix between deterrence and compliance. 
There needs to be enough of a background threat of prosecution that regulatees feel 
bound to comply and to work collaboratively with the regulator, but also such that 
there is a reduced capacity for the regulatory capture. It is possible that the CQC’s 
explicit focus on safety enables them to achieve this balance without compromising 
their ability to follow a compliance approach to enforcement. Safety is within the 
purview of the Health and Safety Executive (“HSE”). 134  Since the CQC has 
responsibility for inspection and managing any ongoing relationship with its regulated 
providers, there is not the same impetus for the HSE to maintain an ongoing 
relationship. The HSE does not need to take a compliance approach. They can 
afford to bring prosecutions as a first rather than last resort. By aligning their priorities 
with the HSE, the CQC give themselves the freedom to follow a compliance 
approach to enforcement while relying on the threat of HSE prosecution to focus 
regulatees on meeting the standards. If the CQC’s compliance approach does fail, 
the HSE provides a safety net to prosecute where there are significant safety failings.  
 
(A) Do public inquiries offer a third way to successful policy change? 
I have argued that the 2014 Regulations suffer from fundamental flaws which 
threaten their success in regulating important aspects of the NHS. Specifically, I have 
argued that the nutrition and hydration standards are too nebulous to be properly 
applicable, and that the duty of candour focuses to its detriment on apologies, 
undermining the necessary focus on transparency and openness. Taking these 
together, I have argued that the 2014 Regulations’ reliance on the expressive power 
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of criminal law cannot address the complex issues that are the regulations’ targets 
without properly funded implementation of its deterrence-focused enforcement 
approach. This is unlikely to eventuate. How then, did such a flawed law come into 
being, and what are the implications for its success? 
 
The literature on policy fiascos indicates two main responses available: the rapidly 
created ‘knee-jerk’ response which risks being unequal to the job required of it, and 
the pre-prepared response waiting for the necessary trigger or ‘policy window’ for its 
introduction. The second is acknowledged to have more success because it should 
be better prepared. A typical trigger for dramatic policy change is the dog bite.135 It is 
a small event with significant consequences played out in the media, causing public 
outrage and demands to change the regulatory framework. Inevitably, Hood and 
Lodge’s ‘tombstone pattern’136 follows. The public outcry leads to a rapid change in 
the regulation – whether by knee-jerk response or a pre-prepared policy introduced 
in a policy window – which appears to solve the problem. This regulatory tombstone 
focuses attention on and gives respect to the victims. Then, the problem leaves the 
public consciousness, and is not considered again until the next dog bite. At which 
point we find that the law is impossible to enforce and fails to solve the original 
mischief, or it creates a whole raft of new problems. The Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 
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is a prime example.137 The symbolic element of the regulation makes it more difficult 
to reform it further: ‘tombstones may cast long shadows’.138 
 
When a dog bites a child, only a few people are involved, the child, their parents, the 
dog’s owner. It is a one-off event. Other events acknowledged to be policy fiascos 
such as the banquet hall collapse in Jerusalem139  which caused 23 deaths and 
injuries to over 400 others, are short-term one-off events. They are qualitatively 
distinct from big healthcare catastrophes. The Mid Staffordshire crisis continued for 
four years. Thousands were affected. This was the latest in a long line of protracted 
healthcare catastrophes causing considerable suffering. Before Mid Staffordshire 
there was Harold Shipman, the retained organs scandals at Bristol and Alder Hey 
hospitals, and the contaminated blood scandals. These events do not ever fall from 
the public consciousness. The shadow cast by the retained organs scandals at the 
end of the twentieth century still falls over the use of human tissue today. The 
shadow cast by Mid Staffordshire will fall over healthcare practice for much of the 
future. More importantly, the depth of feeling, and the temporal length of these 
shadows make it difficult to gain public or Parliamentary support for a knee-jerk 
regulatory response. In addition, the complexity of the issues make a true knee-jerk 
                                               
137
 M Lodge and C Hood, ‘Pavlovian policy responses to media feeding frenzies? Dangerous 
dogs regulation’ (2002) 10 Comparative Perspectives 1 
138
 M Dixon Woods, ‘The tombstone effect: Long shadows and the pursuit of comfort’ in R 
Dixon and M Lodge, Explorations in Governance: A collection of papers in honour of 




 R Schwartz and A McConnell, ‘Do crises help remedy regulatory failure? A comparative 
study of the Walkerton water and Jerusalem banquet hall disasters’ (2009) 51 Canadian 
Public Administration 91-112 
 39 
response unlikely. But, healthcare provision is already a highly regulated area, and 
the crises that lead to regulatory change are not ones that were foreseen. They were 
wholly outside the regulation in place at the time. The same is true of Mid 
Staffordshire. It is therefore unlikely that there is a pre-prepared solution waiting for 
the appropriate trigger. 
 
Since neither of the options are available, the government must spend time creating 
a robust response which includes regulatory change where necessary. This is often 
done by establishing a public inquiry or a commission to investigate the crisis and 
make policy recommendations. Policy formation is contracted out to experts, which 
buys time, and provides the government with solid well-designed policy 
recommendations ready for adoption. This is tried and tested in the healthcare field. 
Sir Robert Francis QC headed the Mid Staffordshire public inquiry.140 The Shipman 
inquiries were chaired by Lord Laming and Dame Janet Smith. 141  Inquiries into 
retained organs at Bristol Royal Infirmary were led by Professor Sir Ian Kennedy,142 
and at Alder Hey Children’s Hospital by Mr Michael Redfern QC. 143  Professor 
Margaret Brazier chaired the Retained Organs Commission. 144  This moves the 
pressure to get the right solution away from the government and onto the inquiry’s 
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chair. Chairs are limited both by inquiry’s terms of reference and by their experience. 
For example, the first Shipman inquiry was to report in public but to hear evidence in 
private. This decision was successful judicially reviewed 145 , and the second 
incarnation was to be held entirely in public. A similar thing happened with the 
Francis inquiries. Prior to the public inquiry, Francis had chaired an independent 
private inquiry with limited terms of reference. 146  While this might initially limit 
exposure it may not help the government to produce an appropriate regulatory 
response. If the terms of reference are sufficiently broad, the limiting factor is the 
inquiry chair themselves. Appointing a traditional doctrinal lawyer to chair a public 
inquiry may result in recommendations that are legalistic and rely heavily on 
command and control legislation. A behavioural economist will produce a regulatory 
framework primarily based around nudges and remedying cognitive bias. In order to 
get both the terms of reference and the chair appointment right, the government 
needs to have a clear idea of its expected outcomes. Most successful may be a 
balanced team of “chairs” bringing different experiences. 
 
The root cause of the Mid Staffordshire crisis was the culture of secrecy and the 
Healthcare Commission’s unwillingness to look behind institutional assurances. This 
compliance-focused approach to enforcement led to the Healthcare Commission’s 
capture. The CQC complained that it was difficult to bring serious enforcement 
actions against institutions. The Francis recommendations and the 2014 Regulations 
has attempted to address this. The duty of candour is intended to reverse cultures of 
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secrecy. The 2014 Regulations make it easier to bring enforcement actions, and 
make the more serious actions more available. Recommendations were made about 
how the CQC could be more independent. However, the two case studies above 
indicate that the Regulations have the hallmarks of a legalistic response with heavy 
reliance on the criminal law. This pushes inspectors to take a deterrence approach to 
enforcement increasing the hostility in the CQC’s relationships with its registered 
providers. Future failure is indicated in two distinct ways. The nebulousness of the 
food and drink standards and the limits of their application indicate failure due to 
under-regulation. The standards will catch the worst examples of poor hospital food, 
that which would endanger the health and life of the patients. They are unlikely to 
address the problem that food across the sector is generally poor and unappetizing 
since this would not have an impact significant enough to be caught by the 
regulations. Further, since the penalties are so stringent for failure to meet these 
standards, enforcement activity will only take place in the most serious of cases. This 
makes it unlikely that the food provisions can raise standards. The duty of candour 
regulations point to potential failure due to over-regulation. Its purpose was to embed 
transparency and openness in institutional approaches to errors and serious 
incidents. If the implementation of the duty transfers the burden to individual staff 
members it becomes a de facto individual duty to apologise, which inappropriately 
over-regulates individual behaviour, while deemphasising institutions. The focus 
becomes whether the individual healthcare professional was correct to apologise, 




The shortcomings of knee-jerk responses to policy fiascos are well known in the 
literature. By any standard, however, the 2014 Regulations were a cautiously framed 
measure. I have shown that the 2014 Regulations suffer from fatal flaws despite the 
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caution and effort that went into their making. There are problems of both under- and 
over-regulation highlighted by the case studies of the nutrition and hydration 
standards and the duty of candour. The centrality of criminal offences in the 
enforcement provisions pushes the CQC towards a legalistic deterrence approach to 
enforcement, increasing the potential for pushback from registered providers, and a 
consequent need to rely on the more burdensome and more expensive enforcement 
measures. Unless the CQC are properly resourced, it sets them up for greater 
impotence in their regulatory arena. Further, any attempt to lessen the focus on the 
criminal offences through reform of the regulations at a later date would undermine 
the symbolic importance of having serious penalties for similar failures. It is difficult to 
see what other direction the 2014 Regulations could have taken. The events at 
Stafford Hospital were terrible. The culture of secrecy was ingrained and 
unshakeable by anything less than the dramatic. The Healthcare Commission’s 
compliance approach had failed. Sir Robert Francis QC is a serious doctrinal lawyer. 
The combination of these factors made the deterrence agenda inevitable, whether 
ideal or not. To make it work, the CQC have to be properly resourced to fulfil that 
agenda. If they are not, then there will be another serious healthcare crisis, which will 
necessarily lead to more stringent regulations, which will need further resources, for 
a restructured regulator. Lodge and Hood’s ‘tombstone pattern’147 is perhaps better 
understood as a tombstone spiral, with ever increasing stringency. 
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